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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 880101
Priority No. 2

JAMES DEVON LANIER,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
The Jurisdictional Statement, Statement of the Case, and
Statement of the Facts are set forth in Appellant's opening brief at
iii, 1-3.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to
suppress his prior convictions, and such error was not harmless.
The State failed to sustain its burden of showing that the probative
value outweighed the prejudicial effect of the prior convictions and
therefore the convictions were not admissible under Rule 609(a)(1).
Nor were they crimes of dishonesty under Rule 609(a)(2).

Had

Appellant testified, there is a likelihood the outcome of the case
would have been different.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING
TO SUPPRESS MR. LANIER'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS.

A. THE STATE FAILED TO SUSTAIN ITS BURDEN UNDER
RULE 609(A)(1) OF PERSUADING THE COURT THAT THE
PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE PRIOR CONVICTIONS
OUTWEIGHED THEIR PREJUDICIAL EFFECT.
"The prosecution has the burden under Rule 609(a) of
persuading the court that the prior convictions should not be
suppressed. . . . [Citations omitted]."
1032 (Utah 1987).

State v. Gentry/ 747 P.2d

Pursuant to subsection (1) of Rule 609(a), this

burden includes establishing "that the probative value of admitting
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant. . . ."

Rule 609(a)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983).

As outlined in Appellant's opening brief at 9-14, an
application of the five "[f]actors to be considered when balancing
probative value against prejudicial effect" as set forth in State v.
Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), establishes that the State did
not sustain its burden under subsection (1) in the present case.
The State acknowledges that in the present case, both the
remoteness of the prior convictions and the similarity between the
robbery conviction and the charges in instant case weigh against
admission.

Respondent's Brief at 5.

The State argues, however that

Mr. Lanier's prior convictions are distinguishable from those
involved in Banner and Gentry because they are relevant to
credibility and that "people who have committed crimes in the past
are more likely to try to cover up their responsibility in the crime
on trial to avoid the harsher penalties associated with having been
previously convicted."

Respondent's Brief at 6.
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Crimes of burglary and robbery do not "inherently reflect
on a defendant's character for truth and veracityU" and "shed[]
about the same light as any crime involving moral turpitude."
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334-5.

The State's argument that

persons who have felony convictions are more likely to lie to avoid
harsher penalties fails to distinguish between felonies and comes
very close to arguing that simply because an individual has a felony
convictionf he is likely to lie under oath.
The State's assertion that burglary and robbery are
deceitful acts since "[t]he burglar who secretly enters the private
home concealing his or her presence" (Respondent's Brief at 10) is
dishonest as is the robber who enters a store beforehand, then later
disguises himself1 is also applicable to most crimes.

A rapist

often sneaks around a house or other premises, concealing his
presence until he locates a victim.

An inmate attempting to escape

similarly conceals his whereabouts.

Yet, this Court has suppressed

convictions for both rape and escape under subsection (1) of Rule
609.

See Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334-35; Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1037-38.
The State also seems to suggest that where "credibility

issues" are crucial, the Court should be more lenient in admitting

1 The State's suggestion that the male robber in this
case was deceitful since "the robber enter[ed] a store posing as a
customer and later on, disguises himself to avoid identification"
(Respondent's Brief at 10) is misleading since, in this case, there
was no evidence that the male robber entered the store prior to the
robbery. Furthermore, there was no evidence that such "deception"
occurred in the robbery for which Appellant had been previously
convicted and which the trial court refused to suppress.

- 3 -

the prior convictions.

Respondents Brief at 6-7.

On the contrary,

in both Banner and Gentry, this Court focused on the importance of
the accused's testimony in conjunction with the role of credibility
issues in the case and found in favor of exclusion because "the
accused's testimony and the importance of credibility in this case
were critical in determining whose version of the facts was correct
since the prosecution's case included no decisive nontestimonial
evidence."
1037-8.

Banner, 717 P.2d at 1335; see also Gentry, 747 P.2d at

In the present case, where the State's case depended

primarily on the long-winded and often inconsistent testimony of
Mr. Martinez, Mr. Lanier's testimony was critical, "warranting
exclusion of the convictions."

Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334.

The State's attempt to argue that Mr. Lanier's testimony
was not crucial instead emphasizes just how crucial the testimony
was in this case.

As the State points out, defense counsel attacked

the testimony of the witnesses and impeached their identification of
him.

Respondent's Brief at 7.

The State points out that

Mr. Lanier's testimony would have been in direct conflict with "the
two prior identifications."

Respondent's Brief at 7.

Because the

testimony would have been in conflict with that of the witnesses,
and due to the impeachment of the witnesses' identification
testimony, including evidence that Mr. Martinez was unable to
describe the hair color of the robber immediately after the incident
(R. 249) and was ninety percent certain that a photograph of someone
other than the defendant showed the robber (R. 255), the testimony
of Mr. Lanier was critical to this case.

The only arguments advanced by the State are that robbery
and burglary may be slightly more probative of credibility than some
other crimes because a defendant might lie to avoid harsher
penalties and that because credibility was important to the case,
the convictions should be admitted.

Even if such positions were

accepted by this Court, they fail to outweigh the prejudicial effect
of the convictions due to the similarity between them and the crime
charged, the remoteness of the convictions, and the need for the
testimony of the defendant.
The trial court abused its discretion in finding that the
State sustained its burden of showing that the probative value of
the convictions outweighed their prejudicial effect, and in finding
the convictions admissible under Rule 609(a)(1), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1983).

B. MR. LANIER'S CONVICTIONS WERE NOT ADMISSIBLE
UNDER RULE 609(a) (2) .
The State mistakenly relies on State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d
33 (Utah 1984), for the proposition that theft crimes are crimes of
dishonesty.

Respondent's Brief at 9.

The State v. Cintron per

curiam opinion was decided under the old rules of evidence and does
not reflect the new direction taken in Utah since adoption of the
federal rules of evidence.

Specifically, State v. Cintron is

inconsistent with Rule 609's more narrow interpretation of
"dishonesty."

This Court has stated that previous opinions which

are inconsistent with the new direction taken since adopting the

federal rules are overruled.
n. 40 (Utah 1986).

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334

State v. Cintron is just such an opinion and

therefore should not be applied under Rule 609(a)(2).
This analysis is buttressed by footnote 45 of State v.
Banner where this Court pointed out that the prosecutorfs reliance
at the trial court level on case law established prior to Rule
609(a) was significant—and presumably not persuasive on appeal.
Both this Court and the Utah State Bar Commission's Rules
Committee's Preliminary Note to the Utah Rules of Evidence indicate
a serious commitment to using the adoption of the federal rules of
evidence as a fresh starting place for the law of evidence in this
state, taking aim at seeking uniformity between the rules by looking
to the federal rules for interpretaiton.
at 1333-34.

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d

The Cintron opinion violates this new direction and

should not be relied upon.
The State contends that "[o]ther courts have ruled that
the theft-burglary-robbery type of crimes are admissible as crimes
of "dishonesty" under Rule 609(a)(2)."

Respondent's Brief at 11.

Three of the four cases cited in support of this proposition—United
States v. Ackridge, 370 F.Supp. 214 (E.D.Pa. 1973); United States v.
Gray, 468 F.2d 257 (3rd Cir. 1972); and United States v. Baber, 447
P.2d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1971)—predate Congress' adoption of the
federal rules of evidence.

The fourth case, United States v.

Bianco, 419 F.Supp. 507 (E.D.Pa. 1976), decided after enactment of
the federal rules, relied only upon pre-federal rules cases.

As the

District of Columbia Circuit Court pointed out in United States v.
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Smith/ 551 P.2d 348, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1976), "[t]he simple answer to
the government's argument is that none of these cases involved Rule
609."

The Smith court further explained that these opinions relying

on pre-609 cases "are not controlling in this case and indeed are
essentially irrelevant."

Ij3. at 365.

The enactment of the federal rules in 1975, and their
adoption in Utah in 1983, represented significant changes in the
treatment of prior convictions as impeachment evidence.

The burden

shifted, the judge's discretion was altered, and the analysis is
distinct.

Cases predating these changes therefore do not offer

helpful insights.
As discussed in Appellant's opening brief at 6-8, robbery
and burglary are not crimes of dishonesty or false statement within
the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2), and the trial court erred in
admitting the convictions under this rule.

C.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR WAS NOT HARMLESS.

As the State points out, the relevant standard of review
is as follows:
[T]he standard for error in cases involving a
wrongful failure to exclude prior convictions is
whether "there was 'a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result for the defendant'
[quotations omitted]."
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1038.
In Gentry, this Court determined:
After a review of the record, we are persuaded
that there is a reasonable likelihood that the
result would have been different had defendant's
prior convictions been excluded and had defendant

taken the stand. Defendant's testimony might have
convinced the jury that the events related by the
victim were untrue. Because of this, we reverse
defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial.
Id.
Similarly, in Banner, this Court reversed the defendant's
conviction where the defendant did not take the stand after the
trial court denied his motion to suppress his prior convictions.
717 P.2d at 1335.

This court pointed out that the defendant had

filed a notice of alibi which he withdrew after the denial of the
motion.

The lack of corroborating nontestimonial evidence and the

fact that the State relied chiefly on the testimony of two
witnesses, one of whom had a past sexual relationship with the
defendant, impacted on this Court's decision that "[a]fter a review
of the record, we are not convinced that had the defendant
testified, the outcome in this case would necessarily have been the
same."

_Id. at 1335.
The present case is similar to Banner in that the

defendant had an alibi defense which was not pursued after the
motion to suppress was denied.

The State relied primarily on two

witnesses, one of whom was involved in the robbery, and had a
history of drug problems.
In addition, Mr. Martinez' testimony was not overly
compelling.

At one point, Mr. Martinez was ninety percent certain

someone other than the defendant committed the robbery.

Under such

circumstances, there is a likelihood that the outcome of this case
would have been different had the defendant testified.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant, JAMES DEVON LANIER, respectfully
requests that this Court reverse his conviction and remand this case
to the District Court for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

((p

day of November, 1988.

<^JhL t cck2/
TOAN C .

WATT

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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